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Introduction
In virtually all the EC Member States, consumer credit reporting has become the most extensively 
used instrument used by lenders to underwrite decisions on borrowings or the supply of goods 
and/or services to customers.  Lenders, in fact, access credit reference databases managed by third 
party providers (the so-called ‘Credit Reference Agencies’) in order to evaluate a consumer’s credit 
application and his or her creditworthiness.
Credit  Reference  Agencies  (CRAs)  are  profit-seeking  private  companies  that  are  deemed  to 
represent an institutional response at the service of the credit industry to the problem of asymmetric 
information  in  financial  markets.   They  maintain  a  full  data  sharing  mechanism based  on  the 
collection of data from the various lenders of information about their customers and, at the same 
time, provide those same lenders with consumer credit reports along with other information services 
and decision making tools, making consumers' personal data and reputations accessible to other 
(potential) creditors.1
Another  reason for  the  credit  industry's  interest  in  CRAs is  that  through an  extensive  detailed 
collection and sharing of personal data they are considered to provide useful services in the fight 
against the growth of over-indebtedness of a borrowing individual.
In  policy  terms,  this  would  confer  to  the  credit  industry  the  tools  for  a  responsible  lending, 
protecting individuals from running up significant borrowings beyond their means.
1* Avvocato (Italy). School of Law, University of Leeds (UK).
 CRAs usually integrate their databases with data from other public sources, such as, for example, electoral rolls, Court 
judgements, bankruptcies and voluntary arrangements, and other private information provided by other organisations 
which compile additional information referring to an individual thus forming a single file. Such files are then made 
available in the form of a Credit Report which is provided to the (potential) lenders for a fee paid to the one or more 
CRAs which they have decided to interrogate each time someone applies for credit or hire purchase.
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Of utmost importance, consultation by lenders of CRAs databases is not mandatory by law prior to 
the underwriting of credit and relies on a voluntary basis.
As  participation  by  lenders  in  a  privately  owned  consumer  credit  information  system  is  not 
compulsory, the rules relating to the functioning of the system itself are not imposed by law or 
regulation but are contracted in a typical supplier-client relationship.
Against this background, the creation of an efficient EC single market in consumer credit in an 
environment in which consumers receive adequate protection is a present concern on top of the 
agenda for the completion of the Internal Market.  To reach this goal, so far the existing Consumer 
Credit Directive 87/102/EEC has proved to be ineffective.2  Thus, the European Commission and 
the European Parliament have recently presented new proposals for a directive on the harmonisation 
of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions concerning credit for consumers.3  However, 
despite  all  the  efforts,  so  far  the  Member  States  have  shown  little  signs  of  agreement,  and 
discussions and counterproposals have been lasting for years.
Thus, the aim of this work is to investigate the existing legal framework and standing of consumer 
credit reporting in the EC, attempting to identify the laws that have an impact on and regulate the 
functioning of consumer information sharing arrangements.  Not only such examination carries an 
interest of its own, but it also appears useful to determine its suitability for a common market in 
consumer credit.  How closely does it reflect or parallel the future legislative developments at EC 
level (if any) of a retail credit sector in which consumers receive adequate protection?
To reach its goals, this articles attempts to locate the positive law across Europe without entering 
into  the  details  of  single  national  provisions  of  law.   This,  in  fact,  would  require  an  in-depth 
analysis of its own that is worth of attention elsewhere.  Likewise, it is not the purpose of this study 
to  make an analysis  of  the compliance of  the industry with the  legal  framework so identified. 
2 Directive 87/102/EC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member states 
concerning consumer credit, OJ L 042, 12/02/1987 p. 0048-0053.
3 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers, COM (2002) 443 final 2002/0222 
(COD);   Modified proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for 
consumers amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, COM(2005) 483 final 2002/0222(COD).
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Nevertheless, for the criticality of the difficult questions that consumer credit reporting raises, it 
ultimately suggests  that  further  research by lawyers  and scholars  in  the  field,  as  well  as  open 
debates by policy makers, should precede any search for an appropriate regulatory model for the 
EC.
The legal framework
As it  happens in every business sector,  there are various regulatory scenarios within which the 
consumer information industry may operate.  These are: general provisions of a comprehensive law, 
industry-specific (or sectoral) laws, industry codes of self-discipline (or, else, codes of conduct or 
practice), absence of any form of regulation.
Normally, industry-specific laws have the advantage to represent a derogation to general laws that 
may interfere with a business, in so far as the latter successively do not abrogate them.  They are 
specifically tailored for the issues that distinctively affect a particular industry and involve detailed 
provisions covering a vast array of situations that typically (may) occur.
This may particularly be the case for consumer credit reporting in those circumstances where it is 
not mandated by law and there is no legal obligation for consumers to provide information nor for 
lenders to obtain a credit report before granting credit.
For  example,  in  the  U.S.,  the  country  where  credit  reporting  first  originated  long  before  its 
transplantation in Europe, the passage of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) was one of the 
events that left an indelible mark on the industry.4
First  passed by  Congress  in  1970,  the  FCRA took effect  in  1971 and for  the  following years 
regulated specifically credit reporting, with only minor amendments until the substantive changes 
adopted in 1996 and 2003 to further protect consumers.  From its enactment, it applied only to 
individuals (not legal persons) and only to consumer credit (not the business or commercial one) 
4 Furletti M., An Overview and History of Credit Reporting, Discussion Paper, Payment Cards Center, Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, (Philadelphia,2002), 16.
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setting forth the rules that govern the reporting activities of CRAs in the U.S. and regulating the 
way they must interact with creditors and consumers.
Ultimately, the law permitted CRAs to collect consumer credit data and assemble credit reports 
freely.  At  the  same  time,  the  three  broad  themes  that  dominated  the  legislative  debate  and 
intervention were highlighted in the preamble of the FCRA: "to ensure that consumer reporting 
agencies  exercise  their  grave  responsibilities  with  fairness,  accuracy,  and  a  respect  for  the 
consumer's privacy".5
In this regard, it is important to note that the FCRA has not been the only piece of legislation that 
has legitimised credit reporting in the U.S. 
In 1974, in fact, the enactment of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) ensured the complete 
acceptance of credit reporting outlawing discrimination in that all consumers were given an equal 
chance to obtain credit.  What is relevant about the ECOA for the purpose of this discussion is that 
among  the  factors  that  contribute  to  the  final  decision  to  extend  credit  there  is  the  explicit 
recognition of credit histories (together with amount of income, expenses, and debts). 6
In  the  end,  therefore,  in  the  U.S.  industry-specific  laws  such  as  the  ECOA  and  the  FCRA 
contributed decisively in the legitimisation by law of the use of credit reports for credit granting 
purposes to consumers.
To date,  however,  this  approach is  alien to  the EC where  there  is  no industry-specific  law at 
Community level.  Similarly, at national level the Member States do not have laws equivalent to the 
FCRA and/or the ECOA.
Of  course,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  market  remains  unregulated,  but  rather  that  general 
provisions  of  comprehensive  law apply.   Exceptionally,  though,  some  Member  States  provide 
domestically  for  few  dispositions  concerning  consumers’  data  within  the  context  of  other 
regulations.7
5 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat 1114, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
6 Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.
7 As it will be seen below, for example, this occurs within a banking act or, more commonly, data protection legislation.
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The  following  sections  attempt  to  identify  those  comprehensive  laws  that  may  affect  the 
mechanisms at study in the EC.
Bank Secrecy
As seen, banks and other financial institutions (non-banks) share their customers’ information via 
third-party CRAs.
At a first glance, this practice collides with that banks’ customers expectation of confidentiality for 
financial  and  commercial  transactions,  whose  history  can  be  traced  back  thousands  of  years, 
mention of it being reported already at the time of the Roman empire.8
In many cases, in fact, bank secrecy laws are cited as a primary reason for influencing (in some 
cases obstructing) the development of credit reporting in a country, pulling in opposite directions 
and sometimes serving as a barrier.9
Among the several objectives of bank secrecy laws, the most evident one is to protect customers 
from the unwanted distribution of information about their financial matters.  Certainly, it cannot be 
denied that in some occasions there may be objectionable reasons for the customers’ interest in 
bank secrecy, including illegal activities such as for example money laundering, tax evasion and 
various forms of illicit use of the financial system.  At the same time, however, there are a number 
of legitimate interests for customers to maintain the confidentiality of their financial data, last but 
not  least  general  privacy  considerations.   Actually,  this  assertion  is  easily  tested  in  today’s 
international  recognition  and  acceptance  of  the  confidential  nature  of  bank  transactions  when 
criminal offences are not involved.
The duty of confidence by banks raises difficult  questions and complex legal issues which are 
beyond the scope of this work in so far as they do not collide with the subject matter at study.10
8 Bonini R., Corso di Diritto Romano, (Maggioli, 1984);  Talamanca M., Lineamenti di Storia del Diritto Romano, 
(Giuffré, 1989).
9 Del Villar R., Diaz de Leòn A., and Hubert J.G., “Regulation of Personal Data Protection and of Credit Reporting 
Firms: A Comparison of Selected Countries of Latin America, the United States, and the European Union”, in Miller 
M.J. (Ed.), Reporting Systems and the International Economy, (MIT Press: Cambridge, 2003), pp. 397-431.
10 For a thorough analysis of international banking secrecy laws, see Campbell D. (1992), International Bank Secrecy, 
(Sweet & Maxwell: London, 1992).
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Moreover,  the  legal  protection  for  confidentiality  at  the  disposal  of  customers,  however,  may 
present appreciable differences from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
this  examination,  and  bearing  in  mind  that  each  country  has  its  own  peculiarities,  a  general 
distinction could be drawn between civil and common law countries, pointing out eventual common 
characteristics.
In  common  law  countries  the  duty  of  confidentiality  is  an  implied  term  in  the  contractual 
relationship between a bank and its customer.  This obligation, therefore, does not arise from statute 
or legislation but from precedents that form a body of case law decided by competent Courts in 
common law jurisdictions.
To summarise, the historic leading case is  Tournier v. National Provincial and Union Bank of  
England, in which it was established that the bank owed its customer a legal, and not merely a 
moral,  duty  of  confidentiality  and  could  not  lawfully  disclose  to  third  parties  information 
concerning the customer’s affairs11.
This duty is not absolute but it is qualified by four exceptions, namely:
(i) where disclosure is under compulsion by law; 
(ii) where there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
(iii) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; 
(iv) where disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer.
Exceptions  (i)  and  (ii)  mean that  the  release  of  a  customer’s  confidential  information  may be 
mandated by law in cases where the public interest prevails as the latter will suffer if disclosure 
does not occur.  This, for example, happens in cases of criminal offences and tax evasion, or for the 
purposes of banking supervision (intended as the reporting of financial data by banks to monitor the 
soundness of the financial  system).   Significantly,  in most cases – and certainly in the case of 
11  [1924] 1 K.B. 461.
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banking  supervision  -  the  data  of  customers  do  not  became publicly  available  but  rather  their 
dissemination is limited to the relevant authorities (such as, for example, a bank supervisor) that in 
turn are required to maintain a certain degree of confidentiality.
As  far  as  consumer  credit  reporting  is  concerned,  this  is  radically  different  from  banking 
supervision.  In fact, while the former represent a tool at the service of lenders (banks and non-
banks) for their profitability, the latter is a public function carried by central banks or other public 
regulatory bodies that serve a public interest in the general stability of the banking and payment 
system.12
Also, this work has already stressed that the use of CRAs by lenders is not mandated by law, 
occurring on a voluntary basis.
Thus,  legal  scholars  mainly  assume that  banks  have  been  relying  on  either  exception  (iii)  the 
interest of the bank; or exception (iv) consent of the customer; but it is arguable that banks have no 
entitlement to divulge customers’ credit information under the common law and that the safest and 
proper  course  of  action would be to  ensure  that  they have  the consent  of  the customer,  either 
express or implied.13
In civil law countries such as European continental jurisdictions, by contrast, bank secrecy is not 
limited to a contractual obligation of the bank to its customers, but the obligation may also arise 
from statute or legislation, generally in the banking law or civil code, or from tradition.  This, 
however, does not mean to say that it cannot be overridden by other legislation making exception to 
the rule.  In some cases, besides, a breach of bank secrecy may constitute a criminal offence, unlike 
in common law jurisdiction where it gives rise to a civil claim for damages and/or a right to an 
injunction to prevent further disclosure.
Obviously, the exact content of the law varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, an example of which 
is provided in Table 1 below.
12 Jappelli T. and Pagano M., Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience, CSEF Working Paper 
No. 35, University of Salerno, (Salerno, 2005).
13 Wadsley J. and Penn G. A., The Law Relating to Domestic Banking, 2nd ed., (Sweet & Maxwell: London, 2000), pp. 
137-199;   Campbell A., “Bank Confidentiality and the Consumer in the United Kingdom”, in Cartwright P. (Ed.), 
Consumer Protection in Financial Services, (Kluwer Law International: London, 1999) pp. 93 et seq.
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Table 1
Source: Research Group – Centre for Economic Studies,  IFO Institute for Economic Research, 
Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research.14
Country Sources Secrecy Laws Punishment  of  banks  officials  for 
violation of bank secrecy
Austria 1,2 Sections 23, 23a, 34, 35a of the Credit System Act 
(KWG). Relatively new amendments, they indicate 
a  moderate-strong  level  of  secrecy  and  are 
solidified through Austrian court decisions.
There  are  criminal  sanctions,  the 
prosecution  is  at  the  request  of  the 
injured party.
Belgium 1 Secrecy is not written out, rather is observed out of 
tradition.  However,  society  places  little  value  in 
banking secrecy, and consequently secrecy is rather 
weak.
No  criminal  offence,  but  any  loss 
from  wrongdoing  must  be 
reimbursed.
Denmark 1,2 Banking code explicitly states that secrecy must be 
maintained, leading to a “more trusting relationship 
than what is usual in business”.
Moderate prison terms and fines.
Finland 1,2 Generic  secrecy  law  exists,  although  not 
particularly strong.
There are criminal sanctions, as well 
as compensation and/or fines.
France 1,2 Formerly the topic of discussion, Article 57(1) of 
the Banking Law passed in 1984 clearly indicates 
bank secrecy in France.
Criminal sanctions and fines.
Germany 1 Not  explicitly  written  out  anywhere,  Germany 
refers to Art. 2(1) of the Basic Law which grants 
every  individual  the  right  to  develop  his  own 
personality; this law is viewed as including bank 
secrecy.
Reparations for lost money, and the 
right for the customer to seek a court 
injunction against a bank.
Greece 1 Generally held that bank secrecy has become a law 
through  time-customs,  the  Law  Decree  of  1971 
recognised  this  and  placed  bankers  under  almost 
absolute secrecy.
Criminal sanctions
Ireland 1 Secrecy  is  not  clearly  written  out,  yet  enforced 
through court decisions.
n.a.
Italy 1 Unwritten, yet traditionally observed (thus legally 
binding) provision restrict  bankers from releasing 
information to third parties.
Failure to comply with court orders 
are  punishable  with  criminal 
sanctions.
Luxembourg 1 Article  458  of  the  Penal  Code  states  that  “... 
professionals  (i.e.  bankers,  etc.)  who  come  into 
contact with secrets entrusted to them must respect 
those secrets”.
A fine is imposed for divulgation of 
confidential information.
Netherlands 1 No written law, the country relies on the principles 
gleaned from the intent of the law to define bank 
secrecy.
Moderate fines/sentences
Portugal 1 Decree Law 2/78 was passed stating that the utmost 
concern  must  be  shown  for  the  safeguarding  of 
bank secrecy.
n.a.
Spain 1 No  express  provision  establishing  secrecy,  yet  a 
secrecy clause exists in the bylaws of the Bank of 
Spain.
Moderate  fines  and  criminal 
sanctions.
Sweden 1 General  provision  states  that  the  relations  of 
individuals to a bank may not be disclosed without 
legal causes.
Fines/reimbursement
United 
Kingdom
1 No written  law,  Tournier  v.  National  Provincial  
and Union Bank of England (1924) created a clear 
definition  of  bank  secrecy,  although recent  court 
Civil sanctions
14 CESifo Dice, available at http://www.cesifo-group.de/pls/diceguest/download/F4547/LAWS/PDF.
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decisions have weakened it.
1  Campbell D. (1992), International Bank Secrecy, Sweet & Maxwell, London.
2  The Center for the Study of Central Banks, New York University, http://www.law.nyu.edu/centralbankscenter/
An interesting model is represented by some other countries that explicitly mention directly in the 
banking law what activity is permitted, thus avoiding any conflict with bank secrecy.
This is the example offered by credit reporting in the Czech Republic, that managed to implement 
data  sharing  arrangements  through  the  provision  of  an  exception  in  the  banking  law that  was 
introduced only very recently expressly to grant banks the authority to share information.15
As mentioned, the major erosion of the concept of bank confidentiality has occurred through the 
introduction in both common law and civil law jurisdiction of legislation to fight criminal activities, 
tax evasion, and abuses of the financial system.
For the purposes of this work, in many cases the sharing (i.e. disclosure to third parties) of financial 
data is allowed through the individual authorisation of customers (i.e. individual consent) required 
by banks.  However, whether such authorisation is the free choice of the individual or rather is 
enforced by financial institutions is all another (crucial) matter.
In the end, therefore, it may well be that nowadays a banker’s duty of confidentiality, whether in 
common law or civil law, have very similar rules as to when information may be disclosed, either 
pursuant to overriding statutory obligation or by way of consent.
Thus, individual authorisation by consent seems the element that consumer credit reporting has to 
rely on to avoid breaches of bank secrecy, at least until the day it will be required and/or regulated 
15 The Banks Act No. 21/1992.   Article 38° states that “(1) Banks and foreign bank branches may provide each other 
with bank account details, identification data on account holders and information on matters attesting to the financial 
soundness and trustworthiness of their clients, including via legal entities which are not banks. Holdings in such legal 
entities may only be held by banks, which shall see to it that such legal entities keep the information secret and protect it 
against misuse. (...). (2) The Czech National Bank shall create a database from the information within the scope referred 
to in paragraph 1 obtained from banks, foreign bank branches, and other persons where a special legislative act so 
provides. (...) The transfer of information into this database shall not be deemed a breach of banking secrecy. However, 
banks and foreign bank branches shall treat information on the clients of another bank or foreign bank branch acquired 
from the database as if it were information on their own clients. (3) (omissis)”.
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by law (if ever), except in those countries where the exception is purposely in the banking law 
itself.16
Data Protection
As it emerged already very clearly from the study conducted so far, an impressive number and type 
of  personal  data  are  involved,  constituting  the  basis,  or  ‘raw  material’,  of  consumer  credit 
information systems.
To begin with, therefore,  in the EC the activities of CRAs necessarily fall  within the scope of 
privacy legislation, more specifically data protection.
While bank secrecy obligations are part of a long-standing legal tradition, though eroded in recent 
years, data protection laws are a relatively new phenomenon.17
From the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II, when the Nazis regime used various data 
collection and mining techniques available at the time to identify and persecute Jews all over the 
countries of their dominion, there is general consensus in Europe that information can become a 
tool of oppression and personal privacy must be protected.18
Such consciousness  was reflected  very soon in  many European countries,  which  recognised at 
domestic level the importance of privacy as a fundamental freedom of the individual and considered 
its protection as a constitutional principle.19
16 See above the example of the Czech Republic.
17 It is useful to remind that data protection is one of several concepts (or aspects) of privacy, thus the two are not 
coincidental.  See Privacy and Human Rights – An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments, Electronic 
Privacy Information Centre (Washington D.C., 2002) and Privacy International (London, 2002).  According to the 
Report, “the recognition of privacy is deeply rooted in history. There is recognition of privacy in the Qur'an [an-Noor 
24:27-28 (Yusufali); al-Hujraat 49:11-12 (Yusufali)] and in the sayings of Mohammed [Volume 1, Book 10, Number 
509 (Sahih Bukhari); Book 020, Number 4727 (Sahih Muslim); Book 31, Number 4003 (Sunan Abu Dawud)]. The Bible 
has numerous references to privacy [Richard Hixson, Privacy in a Public Society: Human Rights in Conflict 3 (1987).  
See also, Barrington Moore, Privacy: Studies in Social and Cultural History (1984)]. Jewish law has long recognized 
the concept of being free from being watched [See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze (Random House 2000)]. There 
were also protections in Classical Greece and ancient China [Robert Ellis Smith, Ben Franklin's Web Site 6 (Sheridan 
Books 2000)].” (Italic added, it transcribes the references indicated in the Report).
18 Privacy and Human Rights, op. cit supra note 17.  Kuner C. (2005), “Privacy, Security and Transparency: Challenges 
for Data Protection Law in a New Europe”, EBLR (2005), 1-8;   Samuelson P. (2000), "Privacy as Intellectual 
Property", 52(5) Stanford Law Review (2000), 1125-1174.   Singleton S., Privacy and Human Rights: Comparing the 
United States to Europe, White Paper written for the Competitive Enterprise Cato Institute’s conference on financial 
privacy, (The Cato Institute: Washington D.C. 1999).
19 The genesis of modern legislation in this area at European national level can be traced to the first data protection law 
in the world enacted in the Land of Hesse in Germany in 1970. This was followed by national laws in Sweden (1973), 
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As well,  at  international level the significance of providing an adequate legal protection to the 
privacy of individuals has been cherished for the first  time as early as 1953 in the Council  of 
Europe’s  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms,  which  in  its  Article  8 
established for the first time ‘the right to privacy’, elevating it as an international human right.20
From the 1960s, the fast developments of information and communication technologies gave rise to 
the need to protect individuals from the massive processing of data regarding individuals and the 
increasing purposes of their use.  Such concerns provoked a shift of regulatory attention from the 
privacy  of  individuals  to  the  more  specific  concept  of  protection  of  ‘personal  data’  which 
culminated in  the 1981 Council  of Europe’s Convention for  the Protection of Individuals  with 
regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data (Convention No. 108/1981).21
Several member states of the European Community, however, did not sign the Convention.22
Still, since the year 2000 the fundamental right to privacy recognised by the European Convention 
of Human Rights has been incorporated also in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Article 8).23
Importantly,  moreover,  the  Convention  represented  a  major  contribution  to  the  current 
Community’s legal framework which culminated in the adoption of the 1995 EC Directive on the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement 
of  Data  (Directive  95/46/EC)  to  respond  to  the  threats  posed  by  sophisticated  information 
the United States (1974), Germany (1977), and France (1978).  See Privacy and Human Rights, op. cit supra note 17.
20 Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, (ETS No: 005) open 
for signature November 4, 1950, entry into force September 3, 1950, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm
Article 8 states: (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except as in accordance with the 
law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-
being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health of morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others.
21 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of Personal Data Convention, 
(ETS No. 108), Strasbourg, 1981, available at http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/108e.htm
22 For example, Italy and Greece.
23 C 364 (2000), p. 0001-0022.
Article 8 - Protection of personal data – states:
“1. Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her.
2. Such data must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or 
some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected 
concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified.
3. Compliance with these rules shall be subject to control by an independent authority”.
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technologies to personal privacy at the same time fostering the single market in a global information 
society.   Thus,  the Directive serves the double purpose of both ensuring the free movement of 
personal data in the internal market and guaranteeing a high level of protection for data subjects.  It 
establishes a minimum level of harmonisation, setting out a high level of normative protection with 
the result that the member states cannot go beyond nor fall short of these minimum standards.24
The scope of the Directive, which applies to any operations performed upon personal data (data 
processing) is to provide for good data management practices on the part  of those entities that 
determine  the  purposes  and  means  of  the  processing  of  personal  data  (data  controllers).   It 
contemplates a sequence of general rules on the lawfulness of the processing of personal data, the 
principal ones including the following obligations: (i) to process personal data only for specified, 
explicit  and  legitimate  purposes;  (ii)  to  use  personal  data  that  are  adequate,  relevant  and  not 
excessive in relation to the purpose for which they are collected and/or further processed; (iii) to 
process accurate and up-to-date personal data, taking any reasonable step to ensure the rectification 
or erasure of inaccurate data; (iv) to keep the personal data in a form that permits identification of 
data subjects for no longer than necessary; (v) to process personal data only upon obtaining the 
unambiguous consent of data subjects after having informed him or her of the processing of the 
data;  (vi)  to  guarantee  the  security  of  the  data  against  accidental,  unauthorised  access,  or 
manipulation; (vii) to provide notification to the national supervisory authority before carrying out 
all or certain types of data processing operations; (viii) to provide for certain safeguards or special 
procedures  in  the  case  of  transfer  of  data  outside  the  EU to  third  countries  that  guarantee  an 
adequate level of protection.25
For the purpose of this discussion, it is worth to emphasise that the Directive applies to all data 
controllers  and/or  any other persons processing personal  data on their  behalf  (data  processors), 
meaning that it is a comprehensive law that creates a regime where the same rules and principles 
apply to everyone across all industries.
24 Directive 95/46/EC, OJ L 281, 23/11/95, p. 0031-0050.
25 Ibid.
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Consumer  credit  reporting  is  no  exception.   Accordingly,  indeed,  data  protection  legislation 
constitutes its principal legal framework having an enormous impact on how, and even whether, an 
the industry develops (or, at least, ought to develop).
Notably,  however,  the  Directive  provides  in  its  Article  5  that  “the  member  states  shall  (...) 
determine more precisely the conditions under which the processing of personal data is lawful” 
within the limits of the provisions that it establishes.26
This leaves a distinctive margin of manoeuvre to the Member States, causing the well known result 
of the differing implementation of data protection legislation within their national jurisdiction, as 
well as diverging concepts in its application, despite the principle that “the level of protection must 
be equivalent in all member states”.27
As a result of this lack of uniformity in the implementation of the Directive by the Member States, 
one of the major concerns relates to its legal certainty, as well as a burden for the free movement of 
data in the EC and the effectiveness of equivalent high standards of protection of the rights and 
freedoms of individuals alike.28
In this context, some Member States have enacted provisions or guidelines that further specify the 
domestic regulation of consumer information sharing.  As a consequence, this has contributed to the 
implementation of different national legal requirements for the industry at study that result in the 
lack of coordination one with the other.
Consumer Credit Laws
26 Ibid., Article 5.
27 Ibid., Recital (8) and Recital (9).  According to Recital (9) such margin of manoeuvre in the implementation of the 
Directive should be in accordance with EU Law.   On the differing implementation of the Data Protection Directive 
(95/46/EC) see Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission – First report on the 
implementation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), Brussels 15.05.2003, COM(2003) 265 final;   Korff D. 
Comparative summary of national laws, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive (Study Contract 
ETD/2001/B5 3001/A/49), Human Rights Centre, University of Essex, (Colchester, 2002);   European Commission, 
Analysis and impact study on the implementation of Directive EC 95/46 in Member States, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/privacy.
28 Ibid.   See also Sousa de Jesus A., Data Protection in EU Financial Services, ECRI Research Report No. 6, (Brussels, 
2004), p. 27;   The International Chamber of Commerce, Position Paper to the European Commission on the 
Consultation process on the data protection directive available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/lawreport/paper/uscib_en.pdf.
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Although one may be tempted to think that consumer credit laws by their nature should include the 
regulation of information sharing arrangements, unexpectedly these are normally excluded from 
their provision.
The United  Kingdom provides  an  example  at  national  level  of  the  most  recently  enacted  and 
modern consumer credit  law vis-à-vis  the attitude towards the related issue of consumer credit 
reporting.
The Consumer Credit Act 2006 reforms the Consumer Credit Act 1974.  The aim of the new Act is 
to protect consumers and create a fairer and more competitive credit market.
There have been some pressure from the industry to use the Consumer Credit Act 2006 as a vehicle 
for addressing the subject of data sharing.  However, such issue has been considered wider than just 
those covered by the Consumer Credit Act.  Data sharing does not, therefore, feature in the Act and 
the British Government does not propose to make any changes relating to CRAs.29
The example provided by the UK is in some way reflected at European level, where it appears that 
similar reasoning and choices were made.
Adopted in 1987, the Consumer Credit Directive 87/102/EEC established a legal framework for 
consumer credit throughout the EU with the aim of promoting a common market for credit and 
creating  an  environment  in  which  consumers  receive  adequate  protection.30  Significantly,  no 
provision nor mention of consumer information sharing was made.
Directive 87/102/EEC has been amended twice, in 1990 and in 1998, but again no action in relation 
to consumers’ data was taken on these occasions.
However,  the  minimal  harmonisation  approach  of  Directive  87/102/EEC  has  resulted  in  the 
fragmentation and segmentation of credit markets into separate national ones.  As recent research 
conducted by the Centre for European Policy Studies has stressed, "the introduction of a minimum 
harmonisation clause in Directive 87/102/EC allowed member states to provide a higher level of 
29 Department of Trade and Industry, Consumer Credit Bill, Full Regulatory Impact Assessment, available at 
www.dti.gov/uk/ccp/creditbill/pdfs/creditbillria2.pdf;  See also Experian, Official Website, 
http://www.experian.co.uk/corporate/compliance/consumercredit/consumercredit.html.
30 Directive 87/102/EC for the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the member 
states concerning consumer credit, OJ L 042, 12/02/1987 p. 0048-0053.
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consumer protection in the field of consumer credit than that established in the Directive. In many 
cases, national legislators have used this opportunity and consumer credit legislation has largely 
been  re-nationalised.  This  move  has  resulted  in  a  complex  fragmentation  of  consumer  credit 
regulations throughout  the EU. (...)  Consequently,  with Directive 87/102/EC,  the legislation on 
consumer credit under the minimum harmonisation clause has limited the development of the EU 
internal  market  and reduced the  possibilities  of  expanding the consumer credit  business  across 
member state frontiers".31
As a reaction, the European Commission presented on 11/09/2002 a proposal for a Directive on the 
harmonisation  of  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions  concerning  credit  for 
consumers (hereinafter the ‘Proposal’).32
The Proposal aimed “to pave the way for a more transparent market, a more effective market and to 
offer such a degree of protection for consumers that the free movement of offers of credit can occur 
under the best possible conditions both for those who offer credit and those who require it”.33
The text  spelled out  a  comprehensive set  of  provisions that  would have impacted the way the 
consumer credit industry and market function, including consumer credit reporting.
In particular, in Chapter III of the Proposal titling ‘Protection of Privacy’, Article 7 (Collection and 
Processing of Data) stated:
“Personal data obtained from consumers, guarantors or any other person in connection 
with the conclusion and management of agreements covered by this directive,  and in 
particular  by  Article  6  (1),  may  be  processed  only  for  the  purpose  of  assessing  the 
financial situation of those persons and their ability to repay”.34
31 Lanoo K. and de la Mata Muňoz, Integration of the EU Consumer Credit Market – Proposal for a More Efficient  
Regulatory Model, CEPS Working Document No. 213, (Brussels, Nov. 2004), pp.5-6.
32 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning credit for consumers, COM (2002) 443 final 2002/0222 
(COD).
33 Ibid, Explanatory Memorandum, p. 4.
34 Ibid.  In turn, Article 6(1) – Exchange of Information in Advance and duty to provide advice - of the Proposal 
provided: “Without prejudice to the application of Directive 95/46/EC, and in particular Article 6 thereof, the creditor 
and, where applicable, the credit intermediary may request of a consumer seeking a credit agreement, and any 
guarantor, only such
information as is adequate, relevant and not excessive, with a view to assessing their financial situation and their ability 
to repay.
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The following Article 8 (Central Database), innovatively bringing into play either CRAs or PCBs 
depending to the various institutional arrangements of each Member State, specified:
“1.  Without  prejudice  to  the  application  of  Directive  95/46/EC,  Member  States  shall 
ensure the operation on their territory of a central database for the purpose of registration 
of consumers and guarantors who have defaulted. This database may take the form of a 
network of databases.
Creditors must consult the database prior to any commitment on the part of the consumer 
or guarantor, subject to the restrictions referred to in Article 9. The consumer and, where 
appropriate,  the guarantor  shall,  if  they  so  request,  be  informed of  the  result  of  any 
consultation immediately and without charge.
2. Access to the central database in another Member State shall be ensured under the 
same conditions as for firms and individuals in that Member State, either directly or via 
the central database of the home Member State.
3. Personal data received under paragraph 1 may be processed only for the purpose of 
assessing the financial situation of the consumer and guarantor and their ability to repay. 
The  data  shall  be  destroyed immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  credit  or  surety 
agreement or the refusal by the creditor of the application for credit  or  the proposed 
surety.
4. The central database referred to in paragraph 1 may include the registration of credit 
agreements and surety agreements.”35
The Proposal, finally, introduced in Article 9 the principle of responsible lending, based on the 
requirement  that  a  lender  has  “previously assessed,  by any means at  his  disposal,  whether  the 
consumer  and,  where  appropriate,  the  guarantor  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  discharge  their 
obligations under the agreement”.36
The consumer and guarantor shall reply accurately and in full to any such request for Information”.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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In practice, the introduction of the rather difficult – and controversial  - concept of ‘responsible 
lending’ would have represented an obligation for the ‘good lender’ to consult centralised credit 
databases and to examine the responses provided by the consumer and eventually the guarantor.
The above three provisions of the Proposal would have been an interesting ground for discussion 
and detailed analysis for this work and its subject matter, if it wasn’t that they have been suppressed 
in the modified version presented after rejection of the Proposal on 11/09/2003 by the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament and its consequent withdrawal by the Commission.37
On 10/10/2005, in fact, the Commission presented  pursuant to Article 250(2) of the EC Treaty a 
modified  proposal for  a  Directive  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  on  credit 
agreements  for  consumers  amending  Council  Directive  93/13/EC  (hereinafter  the  ‘Amended 
Proposal’).38
As a whole, the Amended Proposal has revolutionised the original Proposal.  As far as consumer 
information sharing is concerned, the former Article 7 has been completely erased and the former 
Article 6 has been incorporated with substantial modifications in the new Article 5(1):
“The creditor and, where applicable, the credit intermediary shall adhere to the principle 
of  responsible  lending.  Therefore,  the  creditor  and,  where  applicable,  the  credit 
intermediary,  shall  comply  with  their  obligations  concerning  the  provision  of  pre-
contractual information and the requirement for the creditor to assess the consumer’s 
creditworthiness on the basis of accurate information provided by the latter, and, where 
appropriate, on the basis of a consultation of the relevant database. (emphasis added)
Where the credit agreement allows the creditor to change the total amount of credit after 
the date of conclusion of the credit  agreement,  the creditor shall  update the financial 
37 Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, P5_TA-PROV(2004)0297, (A5-0224/2004 - Rapporteur: 
Joachim Wuermeling) PE 338.483, “European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council directive on the harmonisation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the 
Member States concerning credit for consumers (COM(2002) 0443 – C5-0420/2002 – 2002/0222(COD).
38 Modified proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit agreements for consumers 
amending Council Directive 93/13/EC, COM(2005) 483 final 2002/0222(COD)
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information at  his  disposal  concerning the consumer and shall  assess  the consumer’s 
creditworthiness before any significant increase in the total amount of credit”.39
As made clear in the Explanatory Memorandum of the Amended Proposal, the obligation to set up 
national credit reference databases has been deleted, “since this would go beyond the purpose of 
this  Directive.  Issues  relating  to  data  protection  are  already  dealt  with  in  the  Data  Protection 
Directive 95/46/EC. Therefore,  the Commission proposes to guarantee only a mutual  access to 
existing private and public databases on a non-discriminatory basis”.40
In the intention of the legislator, this simply means that the Amended Proposal requires all existing 
databases on consumer credit to be opened up to EU credit providers on a non-discriminatory basis, 
instead of requiring the setting up of new consumer credit databases at national level.41
Finally, as regards the controversial concept of ‘responsible lending’, the Amended Proposal has 
modified the initial formulation requiring lenders to give standardised information about important 
elements such as annual percentage interest rate, fees and monthly repayments when advertising 
consumer credit products.  It also obliges lenders to give consumers comprehensive information 
about a credit agreement in good time before they sign the contract, to document the agreement 
properly and keep the consumers properly informed about their respective rights and obligations 
under the agreement throughout their credit relationship. These information requirements, coupled 
with the right to cancel a credit agreement within fourteen days of signing it, is intended to help 
consumers to avoid taking on more debt than they can afford.  In addition to this core requirements, 
the revised law demands lenders to check a consumer’s creditworthiness before concluding a credit 
agreement with him or her, without imposing any specific means among the many that could be 
used (CRAs, indeed, are just one possibility).42
39 Ibid., Article 5(1).
40 Ibid., Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6;   See also Ibid., Article 8(1) Database Access.
41 European Commission MEMO/05/361 Date 10/10/2005 available at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/05/361&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
&guiLanguage=fr
42 Ibid.
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In the end, therefore, the position of the relevant European institutions after consultation with the 
industry seems to voluntarily neglect the regulation of consumer credit reporting within the context 
of a consumer credit law, with the result that it will substantially leave the status quo in the sector.
It should not be forgotten, in any event, that this is still a proposal and so far the member states have 
shown little signs of agreement in the area of harmonisation of national laws in consumer credit.
From past experience,  therefore,  it  is not excluded that further processes and amendments will 
happen on top of the time necessary for the implementation of a directive whose discussions have 
been lasting for years.  Its enactment, therefore, seems ways too far from being at sight.
Concluding Remarks
This work has examined the legal standing of consumer credit reporting in the EC.
Within the various existing legal  scenarios,  industry-specific  laws are  alien to  the data  sharing 
arrangements  in  place,  thus  at  Community level  there  is  no uniform or  harmonised  legislation 
similar to that that has shaped the industry in the U.S. where they first developed.
What emerges from a survey of the legislative framework in the EC is that omni-comprehensive 
data protection is and will remain the crucial law that to date regulates the sector.
At the same time, the new proposals for a consumer credit directive seem to leave the state of 
affairs unchanged, as the issues relating to consumers’ data have been considered wider than those 
that they intend to cover, referring their regulation back to the data protection directive.
This means, in the end, that it is the data protection legislation as implemented in each national 
Member State that applies.
Certainly, additional intriguing scenarios of other less obvious applicable laws may be identified, 
such as provisions concerning gender recognition (when existing in some Member States) or issues 
of social discrimination and access/exclusion to credit.  As well, the mechanisms of information 
sharing in today’s sensitive context of data protection intended as a human right may give rise to 
new possibilities of other applicable laws, such as those relating to unfair contract terms.  All these, 
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however, would be the result of legal interpretations that should be tested and discussed in detail 
separately elsewhere.
What strikes someone attention from the fragmented application of national data protection laws is 
that  the lack of uniform application of  the rules is  likely to contribute  to leave the sector as a 
domestic business far from the principles of the Community’s Internal Market.  However, the free 
movement  of  people  and  an  effective  mobility  of  Europeans  from a  Member  State  to  another, 
coupled with issues of non-discrimination based on nationality, will require harmonisation in the 
sector.  How is  a lender from one Member State supposed to behave when faced by the credit 
application of an EC foreign national who has changed residency to that Member State and whose 
information are stored in his or her previous country?  What rules should it apply?  Will the EC 
foreign national be discriminated in his or her credit application?
Most importantly, on top of that, policy makers should debate openly whether the sophisticated 
mechanisms of credit reporting comply with the positive law and whether the latter is adequate to 
cover the many issues and concerns that may rise.  The sector, in fact,  is surrounded by many 
difficult questions and complex legal issues such as, for example, concerns over the privacy and 
right to  non-discrimination of  individuals,  the real  connection between credit  reporting and the 
predictability of human behaviour, the meaning of over-indebtedness and the sources of debts, the 
powerful  and arbitrary positioning of privately owned companies such as CRAs in the modern 
society,  institutional  arrangements,  a  system  of  governance  for  the  cross-border  exchange  of 
information  within  the  EC,  competition  in  the  consumer  information  distribution  market,  etc. 
Provided, of course, that consumer credit information is really the answer to responsible lending 
practices in an efficient and thriving consumer credit market, a circumstance that should be still 
demonstrated - either by way of conclusive evidence of a relation of cause and effect or, at least, 
empirically.
As debates of the like are numerous and critical, it would be advisable as a matter of policy to 
carefully analyse and question publicly the many implications of the system of credit reporting 
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itself,  beginning  from  its  worthiness  vis-à-vis  the  many  concerns  for  civil  liberties  and 
discrimination that intuitively it is likely to carry with it.
If the smooth operation and further development of an efficient financial market is important for the 
economy,  at  the  same  time  there  is  a  duty  to  protect  consumers  adequately,  for  instance  by 
preserving the right of individuals to the privacy of their transactions as well as a fair and legitimate 
use of their personal data.
Looking ahead, therefore, legal research on the topic seems particularly important as the EC single 
market and the political desire for further harmonisation and integration within the Community are 
likely to have a dramatic impact on the financial service industry, in particular consumer lending.
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